Ohad Shamir, Sivan Sabato, et al.
Theoretical Computer Science
Autonomous vehicles depend on accurate trajectory prediction to navigate safely in complex traffic. Yet current models are vulnerable to stealthy backdoor attacks: an adversary embeds subtle, physically plausible triggers during training that remain latent until activated. To address this risk, we introduce a structured framework categorizing four trigger types—spatial, kinetic (braking), coordinated, and composite—and demonstrate on two benchmarks (nuScenes and Argoverse 2) and two state-of-the-art architectures (Autobot and Wayformer) that poisoning as little as 5% of training samples can reliably hijack future predictions. We further propose a real-time defense leveraging social attention: by encoding agent histories, computing cross-attention to the target vehicle, and filtering out agents with anomalously high weights, our method neutralizes backdoor triggers without degrading clean-data accuracy. Comprehensive experiments show our defense reduces attack success rates across diverse urban scenarios—intersections, roundabouts, multi-lane roads—highlighting both the severity of backdoor threats and a promising pathway to secure trajectory predictors in autonomous driving systems.
Ohad Shamir, Sivan Sabato, et al.
Theoretical Computer Science
Raymond F. Boyce, Donald D. Chamberlin, et al.
CACM
Donald Samuels, Ian Stobert
SPIE Photomask Technology + EUV Lithography 2007
Lixi Zhou, Jiaqing Chen, et al.
VLDB